Accidente Sukhoi Superjet 100--Impacto Contra Montaña en Indonesia

Phillip J fry

Well-Known Member
REporte al dia 28 de Mayo 2012

On May 28th the Ministry of Transport stated that each of the demo flights was scheduled to take 30 minutes flying from Halim Perdanakusuma Airport to Pelabuhan Ratu and back at 10,000 feet. The Ministry also released a time line of the flight stating, that the aircraft took off Halim Perdanakusuma Airport's runway 06 at 14:21L and climbed to 10,000 feet. The aircraft subsequently established on radial 200 of the HLM VOR (located on Halim Perdanakusuma Airport) and was handed off to Soekarno Hatta Airport's air traffic control at 14:24L. At 14:26L the crew requested and was cleared to descend to 6000 feet, at 14:28L the crew requested a right orbit in the training area Atang Sanjaya (about 3nm north of Bogor). At 14:52L ATC contacted Soekarno Hatta Airport after the aircraft was no longer visible on the radar screen, at 14:55L ATC reported to the ATS coordinator because of the loss of the target. An uncertainty phase followed, at 16:05L ATC contacted Search and Rescue, at 16:55L the alert phase (ALERFA) was invoked and at 18:22L distress phase (DESTRESFA) was invoked after the aircraft's fuel would have run out.

http://www.avherald.com/h?article=44f464f7&opt=0

Rob
 

Phillip J fry

Well-Known Member
Noticias al dia 25 de Junio.

On Jun 25th 2012 the NTSC released immediate safety recommendations reporting the crash site is located at a near vertical wall at the eastern side of Mount Salak at coordinates S6.7094 E106.7353 at 6100 feet MSL. Following intensive search for 22 days a number of items were recovered including APU ECU, HF transceiver, HF power amplifier, HF emergency radio, ELT406, ACRA Control, RCP for MPS-31C, CVR, DME Unit, harddisk, Aeroflot FOM, parachute, collection of aeronavigation information, metal parts from fuselage and the FDR. The aircraft was certified by Russia however was not suitable for commercial operation (i.e. transportation of passengers by fare) and was not the property of a commercial operation airline. No copy of a passenger manifest and aircraft documentation could be found, passenger manifest and aircraft documents were carried only on the aircraft. Recommendations to ensure minimum safe altitude during demonstration flights as well as ensure copies of documentation available on the ground were issued to both Indonesia's Directorate of Civil Aviation and Sukhoi.

http://www.avherald.com/h?article=44f464f7&opt=0

Robert
 
Two months after suffering a fatal accident involving a demonstration airplane once used for air show appearances, Sukhoi Superjet (SSJ) program partners Sukhoi Civil Aircraft (SCAC) and SuperJet International (SJI) are hoping to dampen further speculation about the disaster, at least for this week. Helping it with this will be an Aeroflot SSJ in the static display, and a possible follow-on order from Mexico’s Interjet. The Aeroflot jet–Serial Number 95016–arrived in Farnborough on Sunday afternoon and may remain here until Tuesday.


Although, from a commercial perspective, the program staged a fairly quick rebound after the accident with the sale of six SSJ100-95s to Russia’s Transaero two weeks ago, SCAC and SJI representatives will undoubtedly face more questions here at the Farnborough show about the May 9 crash that took the lives of 45 people.

“The accident in Indonesia, even though it is absolutely unfair and severe, shall fill us up with the strength to work even more intensively and self-sacrificing in order to implement the program…in the memory of our colleagues and partners we’ve lost,” SCAC president Vladimir Prisyazhnyuk told AIN just before the start of the show. “The majority of our customers, partners and other stakeholders assured us that they believe in the SSJ100 aircraft’s success and will support us in running this program.”

As such, SCAC continues to plan for an aggressive acceleration of production, from a planned 20 airplanes this year–following an increase to three a month in the third quarter–to 60 airplanes in 2014. This past January SCAC increased the capacity of its Komsomolsk-on-Amur factory by transferring the fuselage assembly shop to its KnAF branch and adding two workstations in the final assembly process, according to Prisyazhnyuk.

In May, Ulyanovsk-based Aviastar began performing interior installation, allocating a dedicated workspace in a hangar that allows it to mount interiors on four SSJ100s simultaneously. Meanwhile, the outsourcing of “essential” work from KnAF to subcontractors continues, and the establishment of the delivery center in Ulyanovsk has begun. “We also permanently improve final assembly technological processes and production management,” said Prisyazhnyuk.

In service since the spring of 2011, the SSJ100 as of the end of June had carried some 300,000 passengers on almost 5,000 revenue flights, accumulating 9,700 flight hours in the process. Armavia SSJ100’s regularly perform flights from Yerevan to 34 airports in Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Western and Southern Europe and the Middle East. Daily aircraft utilization has reached 16.5 flight hours, while the longest distance exceeded 2,100 nm, on a route from Yerevan to Madrid.

Aeroflot’s eight SSJ100s have performed scheduled flights from Moscow to 27 destinations in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Europe. From the third quarter of this year Aeroflot will receive its SSJ100 aircraft with so-called configuration Full, which meets all performance specifications guaranteed by Sukhoi prior to certification. Under an agreement with SCAC, the airline will begin to return its aircraft with configuration Light to the manufacturer in 2013 as each aircraft accumulates 3,000 flight hours.

“These results achieved through joint efforts of Aeroflot, Armavia, SCAC, SuperJet International and [engine maker] PowerJet sometimes exceeded those of many other new aircraft types in the first year of their commercial operations,” noted Prisyazhnyuk. “For us it is important that the SSJ100 received positive feedback from pilots of both operators.”

SJI, which carries responsibility for preparing crewmembers for the SSJ100, has so far trained 102 pilots, 28 flight attendants and 312 maintenance technicians working for both Aeroflot and Armavia. This year it expects to train some 75 cockpit crews (150 pilots), around 35 cabin crewmembers and roughly 350 mechanics in total at its Venice, Italy and Moscow training centers. A full-flight simulator already operates in Moscow, and SJI expects to complete installation of a second in Venice by the end of the year to help train crewmembers flying for Mexican SSJ customer Interjet.
 

Phillip J fry

Well-Known Member
Reporte final....

Indonesia's National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC) released their final report concluding the probable causes of the crash were:

- The flight crew was not aware of the mountainous area in the vicinity of the flight path due to various factors such as available charts, insufficient briefing and statements of the potential customer that resulted in inappropriate response to the TAWS warning. The impact could have been avoided by appropriate action of the pilot up to 24 seconds after the first TAWS warning.

- The Jakarta Radar service had not established the minimum vectoring altitudes and the Jakarta Radar system was not equipped with functioning MSAW for the particular area around Mount Salak.

- Distraction of the flight crew from prolonged conversation not related to the progress of the flight, resulted in the pilot flying not constantly changing the aircraft heading while in orbit. Consequently, the aircraft unintentionally exited the orbit.

Error de pilotos.........

http://www.avherald.com/h?article=44f464f7/0016&opt=0

Rob
 

Edgar Castro

Super Moderator
Me llamó mucho la atención esta parte del reporte:

At 07:32:48Z the Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS) alerted the crew "Terrain Ahead, Pull up!", 2 seconds later "Avoid Terrain!" and another second later "Avoid Terrain!" The first officer was puzzled "What is that?", the "Avoid Terrain!" alert sounded 4 more times, then the TAWS was selected inhibited. The captain commented "Maybe ... database".
Me parece increíble que una tripulación con tanta experiencia haya ignorado una alerta de terreno.

El sistema EGPWS, TAWS o como quieran llamarle está ahí por una razón y sobretodo en condiciones de instrumentos se debe de confiar en el ciegamente.
 

Rich

Well-Known Member
Me llamó mucho la atención esta parte del reporte:



Me parece increíble que una tripulación con tanta experiencia haya ignorado una alerta de terreno.

El sistema EGPWS, TAWS o como quieran llamarle está ahí por una razón y sobretodo en condiciones de instrumentos se debe de confiar en el ciegamente.
Asi es y lo peor de todo es que fueron aproximadamente 13 diferentes alertas .
 
Superjet Accident Report Details Pilot Errors

The Indonesian National Transportation Safety Committee’s recent final accident report on the May 9, 2012 crash of a Sukhoi Superjet 100 appears to leave little doubt the accident that killed all 45 people aboard was the result of pilot error. The aircraft hit terrain in a mountainous region 75 nm south-southeast of Jakarta during an IFR demonstration flight. The Sukhoi arrived in the Mount Salak area at 10,000 feet. The crew quickly requested descent to 6,000 feet, 1,354 feet below the highest peak in the area. Six minutes later, just 32 seconds before impact, the Sukhoi’s terrain awareness warning system announced, “Terrain ahead. Pull up.” The Taws issued six more crew warnings to “Avoid Terrain” before the crash. The pilot-in-command, apparently believing the warning messages were erroneous, inhibited the Taws. Seven seconds before impact, the Taws could be heard again warning, “Landing gear not down.” The final report lists as contributing factors to the crash the crew’s lack of terrain awareness, the inhibiting of the Taws alerts and prolonged non-flight-related cockpit conversation by the crew below 10,000 feet that caused the pilot flying to lose situational awareness. Jakarta’s approach radar also does not employ a minimum safe altitude warning (MSAW) system that would have alerted ATC to the aircraft’s situation. A post-crash simulation demonstrated that the crew could have avoided the accident as long as 24 seconds after the first Taws alert.

Fuente:
http://www.cfmediaview.com/lp1.aspx?v=8_66829470_1952_12
 
Arriba