Accidente de Continental Connection (Colgan Air) en Bufalo

capt. ars

Member
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Safety Alert 2009-1
BUF ILS Hazard



Hazard to ILS to runway 23 in BUF
SWAPA Pilots,

There is a potentially significant hazard concerning the ILS to runway 23 in BUF.

Information has been received indicating it is possible to obtain a significant nose pitch up, in some cases as much as 30 degrees, if the glide slope is allowed to capture before established on centerline. Pilots who are preparing to configure and land have the potential to experience abrupt pitch up, slow airspeed, and approach to stall if conditions present themselves in a certain manner.

This effect is the result of an earthen obstruction close enough to the ILS to affect the integrity of the glide slope signal. This has resulted in the issuance of an advisory given on ATIS which states that "the ILS Glide Slope for runway 23 is unusable beyond 5 degrees right of course."
When attempting to intercept the runway 23 ILS from right traffic, the ILS glide slope indication may read full deflection down. Just prior to intercept it may then move up in such as manner as to enable approach mode to capture in such a way as to result in a nose up pitch and loss of airspeed.

Southwest Airlines has issued a notice reading: "Until further notice, when executing the KBUF ILS/LOC Runway 23, DO NOT select Approach Mode until established on the localizer inbound."
This issue is being addressed on several levels in an attempt to address procedures, facilities, and communication regarding this matter. If you experience any issues related to this, please file an ASAP form and or call SWAPA Safety at SWAPA toll free.



Esto podria cambiar completamente la direccion de la investigacion.......
 
B

Boeingstore

Guest
capt. ars dijo:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Safety Alert 2009-1
BUF ILS Hazard



Hazard to ILS to runway 23 in BUF
SWAPA Pilots,

There is a potentially significant hazard concerning the ILS to runway 23 in BUF.

Information has been received indicating it is possible to obtain a significant nose pitch up, in some cases as much as 30 degrees, if the glide slope is allowed to capture before established on centerline. Pilots who are preparing to configure and land have the potential to experience abrupt pitch up, slow airspeed, and approach to stall if conditions present themselves in a certain manner.

This effect is the result of an earthen obstruction close enough to the ILS to affect the integrity of the glide slope signal. This has resulted in the issuance of an advisory given on ATIS which states that "the ILS Glide Slope for runway 23 is unusable beyond 5 degrees right of course."
When attempting to intercept the runway 23 ILS from right traffic, the ILS glide slope indication may read full deflection down. Just prior to intercept it may then move up in such as manner as to enable approach mode to capture in such a way as to result in a nose up pitch and loss of airspeed.

Southwest Airlines has issued a notice reading: "Until further notice, when executing the KBUF ILS/LOC Runway 23, DO NOT select Approach Mode until established on the localizer inbound."
This issue is being addressed on several levels in an attempt to address procedures, facilities, and communication regarding this matter. If you experience any issues related to this, please file an ASAP form and or call SWAPA Safety at SWAPA toll free.



Esto podria cambiar completamente la direccion de la investigacion.......
yo creo que si, entonces ya no seria culpa del piloto oh ICE! sino ya seria question del ILS! :?:
 
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Training faulted in deadly Buffalo air crash



The tail of the airplane is visible as debris burns at the scene of a Continental Airlines crash Feb. 13 in Clarence Center, New York, just north and east of Buffalo.

NBC News and msnbc.com
updated 2 hours, 48 minutes ago

The captain of a commuter plane that crashed Feb. 12 while en route to Buffalo had flunked numerous flight tests during his career and was never taught how to handle a mid-air stall in the aircraft he was flying that day, NBC News confirmed Monday.
All 49 people aboard the Bombardier Q400 turboprop, being operated by Colgan Air Inc. as Continental Connection Flight 3407, died in the crash, as well as one person on the ground, making it the deadliest U.S. commercial crash in more than seven years.
A story detailing the shortcomings of the captain's training first appeared in the Wall Street Journal on Monday.

The Journal found that Capt. Marvin Renslow, 47, had never been properly trained by the company to respond to a warning system designed to prevent the plane, known as a Dash 8, from going into a stall. In addition, the newspaper found that over his career, Renslow had five unsatisfactory training check-rides, including two at Colgan Airlines, where he had worked since September 2005.
Seemingly routine flight
After a seemingly routine flight from Newark, N.J., the airplane endured a 26-second plunge before smashing into a house in icy weather about six miles from Buffalo Niagara International Airport.
The newspaper found that Renslow had failed in his first attempt to qualify as a co-pilot in the Beech-1900 aircraft and he had to re-do his check-ride to upgrade to captain of a Saab 340-TurboProp.
Colgan's spokesman told the Journal that the company believes Renslow failed to fully disclose that poor performance when applying for a job.
Colgan Air operates a fleet of 51 regional turboprops for Continental Connection, United Express and US Airways Express.
Colgan serves 28 routes for Continental Airlines Inc., which told the Wall Street Journal that it retains "full confidence in Colgan and its ability to conduct its operations safely."
Renslow had 3,379 hours of flying experience but had only flown the Dash 8 since December. In the words of one government official, "Captain Renslow should not have been in the pilot's seat that day."
Investigators are also looking into the experience and training of the flight's first officer, Rebecca Lynne Shaw, 24, of Seattle. She had 2,244 hours of experience and had flown the Dash 8 for 774 hours but was reportedly not feeling well on the flight to Buffalo. She had reportedly flown across country on a red-eye from Seattle the night before, having spent all day skiing.
The pilots' families could not be reached by the Journal for comment.
Reconstructing events before the crash
As NBC News first reported in February, the pilot allowed the aircraft's speed to fall too low. Then, when the aircraft began warning the crew of an impending stall, Renslow pulled back on the yoke, worsening the stall and leading to the crash. Renslow should have pushed the yoke forward to put the nose down and gain air speed.
Government sources told NBC News, "The crew was not paying attention to their air speed." When they finally realized they were flying too slow, it was too late.
The crew also did not maintain cockpit discipline, in which conversations below 10,000 feet are supposed to only deal with aircraft business.
The circumstances surrounding Continental Connection Flight 3407 have prompted investigators and regulators to examine Colgan's hiring and training practices, the Journal reported.

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30683954/
 

Phillip J fry

Well-Known Member
A gran rasgo,

Lo estan manejando como Error del piloto, segun CNN, resulta que el aviador, tenia un mal record de reprobar 5 CHECK RIDES, asi como el factor fatiga.

Saludos

Rob
 
B

Boeingstore

Guest



WASHINGTON — Just seconds before the worst U.S. air crash in more than seven years, the pilot said "Jesus Christ" and moments later his first officer screamed as Flight 3407 plunged to the ground.
A cockpit voice recorder transcript released Tuesday by the National Transportation Safety Board show that only minutes before the Feb. 12 crash on approach to Buffalo, Captain Marvin Renslow and First Officer Rebecca Shaw chatted about her career and shared their fear of flying in icy weather.
Moments later the Dash 8-Q400 Bombardier, a twin-engine turboprop experienced an aerodynamic stall and plunged into a house, killing all 49 people aboard and one man on the ground.

Safety investigators also were told the pilot had trouble learning a critical computer system of the plane he was flying.
National Transportation Safety Board records released Tuesday say investigators were told by one training instructor that Continental Connection Flight 3407's captain "was slow learning" the Dash 8-Q400.
But it said that pilot Marvin Renslow's abilities "picked up at the end."
The training instructor said Renslow, of Shenandoah, Iowa, struggled to learn the Dash 8's flight management system, a critical computer.
On Feb. 12, Flight 3407 experienced an aerodynamic stall on approach to Buffalo in icy conditions when it crashed into the house, leaving 50 dead. The flight was operated by Colgan Air.

The circumstances surrounding Flight 3407 have prompted investigators and regulators to examine Colgan's hiring and training practices.
At the NTSB hearing, witnesses are expected to provide new allegations about training shortcomings, as well as the prevalence of chronic pilot fatigue and lapses in cockpit discipline.
The NTSB also is expected to be critical of the Federal Aviation Administration's oversight of the airline. The FAA, which has said it is investigating the airline over pilot scheduling, declined to comment in advance on issues likely to be raised the hearing.
Capt. Renslow had five "unsatisfactory" training check rides in his career — including two at Colgan — but passed a subsequent series of training tests and was described as "fully qualified" to operate the Q400 aircraft.


Click here for crash photos.
Click here for the cockpit voice recorder transcript(pdf).
Click here for the entire docket for the NTSB hearings into the crash.
Click here for the schedule of the hearings and to watch them via live Webcast.
 

Phillip J fry

Well-Known Member
Pues..

Que tal

En CNN acaban de entrevistar a un instructor de la compania involucrada, y comentan que ahora estan imputando que los pilotos Tuvieron una conversacion no apropiada momentos antes del accidente, yo lo entiendo como si no mantuvieran la cabina esteril. Como parte de la investigacion, en las transcripciones esta que venian hablando precisamente de sus temores a las condiciones de hielo , y como si esto provocara un "Descuido" y que perdieran velocidad sin darse cuenta por el hielo y por ende entra el Stick shaker y lo demas.

Siguen las investigaciones

Saludos

Robert
 

Jwong

Well-Known Member
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090514/ap_on_go_ot/us_plane_into_home

pequeña cita:

"Continental Connection Flight 3407 's captain, Marvin Renslow, and copilot, Rebecca Shaw, apparently didn't realize they were traveling at dangerously low speeds as the Bombardier Dash 8-Q400, a twin-engine turboprop, neared Buffalo Niagara International Airport on the night of Feb. 12. The plane experienced an aerodynamic stall and plunged into a house below, killing all 49 people aboard and one on the ground.

Board member Debbie Hersman on Thursday raised the issue of a low air speed warning system in questioning NASA scientist Robert Dismukes, an expert on cockpit distractions. The plane lost more than 55 mph of airspeed in 20 seconds while Renslow and Shaw chit-chatted about careers and her lack of experience flying in icy conditions, she noted.

Dismukes agreed that the cockpit voice recorder shows the two were distracted, not realizing their danger until the stick shaker, a stall warning system that violently shakes the pilot's control column, went off.

Asked by Hersman if pilots might benefit from an earlier, audible low-speed warning system, Dismukes said: "Absolutely, you want a very distinctive alert, but not one that is so dramatic. That's well worth looking at."

Hersman said the stick shaker warning came too late and was too sudden.

"I think this crew went from complacency to catastrophe in 20 seconds," she said. "The room is on fire at that point."

Testimony also indicated that Renslow and Shaw made critical errors that may have been the result of fatigue or insufficient training.

When the stick shaker went off, Renslow pulled back on the control column — the opposite of the correct action, which would have been to point the plane's nose down to pick up enough speed to recover. Shaw, without waiting for an order from Renslow, retracted the aircraft's flaps, which help keep the plane aloft at lower speeds.

Renslow, 47, and Shaw, 24, were based at Newark Liberty International Airport in New Jersey, but he commuted from his home near Tampa, Fla., and she lived with her parents near Seattle. Shaw flew cross country overnight as a passenger to make Flight 3407. It's not clear how much sleep either pilot had the previous night."
 

Moy206

Well-Known Member
Family Defends Co-Pilot of Downed Plane AP

posted: 33 MINUTES AGOcomments: 7PrintShareText SizeAAAWASHINGTON (May 15) - The mother and husband of the co-pilot of the commuter plane that crashed as it approached a Buffalo airport defended her on Friday against suggestions she was an unqualified pilot who was tired, sick and distracted when the deadly accident occurred.
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Fiery Air DisasterHandout / AP10 photos The family of a 24-year-old woman who co-piloted a commuter plane that crashed into a house near Buffalo, N.Y., Feb. 12 came out in her defense Friday. "I heard over and over again the issue of fatigue, the issue that she was sick. And she wasn't fatigued, she wasn't sick," Rebecca Shaw's mother, Lynn Morris, said. Her daughter, above, died in the crash along with 49 other people.(Note: Please disable your pop-up blocker)

Rebecca Shaw "was a professional pilot. She took her job extremely seriously. She loved what she was doing," Troy Shaw said of his wife on NBC's "Today" show.
Rebecca Shaw's mother, Lynn Morris, said she felt that not enough was said during three days of National Transportation Safety Board hearings about how qualified and dedicated to flying her daughter was.
"I heard over and over again the issue of fatigue, the issue that she was sick. And she wasn't fatigued, she wasn't sick," Morris said.
In an interview with The Buffalo News, Morris said, "The only thing that I want out there is that my daughter was truly a professional and she was fit to fly and that she was prepared and trained and that she was a good pilot."
Rebecca Shaw, 24, and the captain of Continental Connection Flight 3407, Marvin Renslow, 47, apparently didn't notice a sudden drop in the speed of their twin-engine turboprop as the aircraft neared Buffalo Niagara International Airport on the night of Feb. 12. The plane experienced an aerodynamic stall and plunged into a house below, killing all 49 people aboard and one on the ground.
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Recent Air AccidentsMark Randall, South Florida Sun-Sentinel / MCT33 photos A small plane slammed into a home after taking off from the Fort Lauderdale Executive Airport in Florida on April 17. The pilot had reported a problem and was on his way back to the airport when he crashed. The accident killed the 80-year-old pilot and destroyed the house, but no one on the ground was hurt.(Note: Please disable your pop-up blocker)

There was extensive testimony during the hearings in Washington about possible pilot fatigue and critical errors made during the flight. Other testimony showed Renslow may not have received hands-on training on a key safety feature of the aircraft, the Bombardier Dash 8-Q400, and that Shaw had little experience flying in icy weather. The pilots were employed by Colgan Air Inc. of Manassas, Va., which operated the flight for Continental.
The Shaws had recently moved into her parents' home near Seattle and she had flown across country overnight to Newark, N.J., to make her flight to Buffalo.
Troy Shaw said he spoke to his wife just a few hours before the ill-fated flight and "she sounded fantastic, sounded like any other time I'd talked to her when she was on the job."
Morris called her daughter "amazing" and said "she didn't take chances with her flying. The minute she got on that plane she was ready to fly. She had the training. She had the background. She had the experience."
"In my heart I know that she did everything that was humanly possible to make things come out differently," Morris said.

Fuente: http://news.aol.com/article/buffalo...e/buffalo-commuter-plane-crash-rebecca/485430
 

Phillip J fry

Well-Known Member
Tomado de Airdisaster.com
13 de mayo

WASHINGTON – The co-pilot in a February airline crash that killed 50 people in upstate New York was paid a salary so low that she was living with her parents in Seattle and commuting across the country to her job, according to testimony Wednesday.

One of the safety issues that has arisen in the National Transportation Safety Board's investigation is whether co-pilot Rebecca Shaw and Captain Marvin Renslow may have suffered from fatigue during the accident. Testimony in the three-day hearing, which began Tuesday, indicates Shaw and Renslow made several fundamental mistakes as Continental Connection Flight 3407 approached Buffalo Niagara International Airport in wintry weather the night of Feb. 12.

Airline officials acknowledged at the hearing that Shaw, 24, was paid at a rate of about $23 an hour. They did not dispute an NTSB investigator who said she made $16,254 a year, although she could have earned more if she worked extra hours.

Shaw worked for the airline — Colgan Air Inc. of Manassas, Va., which operated the flight for Continental — for a little more than a year and worked a second job in a coffee shop when she was first hired.

The night before the accident, Shaw flew overnight as a passenger from Seattle, changing planes in Memphis, to report to work at Newark Liberty International Airport. Shaw also complained about congestion and may have been suffering from a cold.

Roger Cox, NTSB's aviation safety operations group chairman, suggested while questioning officials for Colgan that Shaw was commuting because she couldn't afford to live in the New York metropolitan area.

Mary Finnegan, Colgan's vice president of administration, said the company permits pilots to live anywhere in the country they wish. She said the company also allows them to remove themselves from flight duty if they are fatigued.

"It is their responsibility to commute in and be fit for duty," Finnegan said.

Renslow commuted to Newark from his home near Tampa, Fla. Colgan officials said their captains typically have salaries around $55,000 a year.

NTSB investigators said 93 of the 137 Colgan pilots who work out of Newark commute by air to work. The company maintains a crew room at the airport with couches, overstuffed chairs and a big screen TV. Board members said Shaw frequently slept overnight in the crew room in violation of company policy, joking with other crew members that the room had a couch with her name on it.

Colgan officials said overnight sleeping was not allowed in the room because it was a busy place, making quality rest time difficult.

Colgan "looked the other way. I think it's a disgrace, it's despicable," said Pam Weldon of Greenwich, Conn., a family friend of a passenger killed in the crash. "They called it 'napping.' They knew it was sleeping."

A transcript of the cockpit voice recorder released Tuesday by the board showed Renslow and Shaw engaging in chitchat about careers and her lack of experience flying in icy conditions during the plane's final minutes, even after they had noticed a buildup of ice on the windshield and the wings.

The Dash 8-Q400 Bombardier, a twin-engine turboprop, experienced an aerodynamic stall, rolling back and forth before plunging into a house below. All 49 people aboard and one on the ground were killed.

Colgan officials acknowledged in response to board members' questions that Renslow and Shaw weren't paying close attention to the plane's instruments and were surprised by a stall warning. Nor did they follow the airline's procedures for responding to a stall.

Further testimony and documents also showed that Renslow had failed several training tests before and after being hired by Colgan in 2005. He had been certified to fly the Dash-8 plane for about three months.

Paul Pryor, Colgan's head of pilot training, acknowledged that Renslow didn't have any hands-on training on the Dash 8's stick pusher — a key safety system that automatically kicks on in response to a stall — although he had received hands-on stick pusher training on a smaller plane that he previously flew.

The accident was the worst U.S. airline crash in seven years.


La Copiloto Ganaba 16 254 dolares Al año es es 214,552 mil pesos al año, serian al mes 17,870 pesos al mes, 23 dolares por cada hora.

Pues, ciertamente yo creo que estos factores contribuyeron al accidente (la fatiga)

Robert
 
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Airline that trained Buffalo crash pilot fined $1.3M

http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2009-05-21-buffalo-crash_N.htm


The federal government on Thursday issued a $1.3 million fine against a Florida airline that had trained the pilot of the commuter plane that crashed in February near Buffalo.
Gulfstream International Airlines, which flies for Continental Airlines in Florida and Ohio, falsified records showing how long its pilots worked, allowing the pilots to fly for more hours than federal law allows, the Federal Aviation Administration charged. The airline also installed unapproved parts and did not properly maintain its fleet of turboprops, the agency said.
The fine, which Gulfstream can challenge, is unusually large for a small airline. It operates 25 Beech 19D planes.
The company did not respond Thursday to telephone and email requests for comment on the FAA action.
Gulfstream and its sister company, Gulfstream Training Academy, offer pilots commercial experience in exchange for purchasing training. For about $25,000, a pilot with limited or no experience can work at "an actual airline flying real flights for Continental Connection," the academy's website says.
Capt. Marvin Renslow, who was at the controls when a Colgan Air commuter plane went wildly out of control and plunged to the ground on Feb. 12, trained with Gulfstream in 2004 and 2005, according to National Transportation Safety Board records. Colgan Air was operating under contract for Continental Airlines at the time of the Buffalo crash.
The copilot on a Comair flight that crashed in 2006 after trying to take off from a dark, closed runway in Lexington, killing 49 of 50 people aboard, also worked at Gulfstream, according to NTSB records. So did the two pilots on a Pinnacle Airlines flight who were joyriding in an empty jet before snuffing out both engines and crashing in Missouri in 2004. The pilots were the only people on board the Pinnacle flight.
Gulfstream is the best known of the handful of schools offering training pilots "pay to fly" services, said Louis Smith, President of FltOps.com, which helps pilots find jobs at airlines. Most would-be airline pilots train at colleges offering aviation programs or at traditional flight schools, Smith said.
Capt James Bystrom, director of Gulfstream Training Academy, said before the fine was announced that it would be unfair to blame accidents that occurred at other airlines on Gulfstream. Like thousands of other Gulfstream graduates who have gone on to other airlines, all those pilots had passed tests administered by FAA representatives and had completed training at their airlines, Bystrom said.
"We don't compromise on safety," he said.
 
Última edición por un moderador:
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FAA Probes Trainer of Commuter Pilots




An airline that has trained many of the nation's commuter pilots -- including the captain of the Continental Connection flight that crashed near Buffalo, N.Y., in February -- faces a possible $1.3 million government penalty for alleged crew scheduling and maintenance violations.
The Federal Aviation Administration accuses Gulfstream International Airlines Inc. of faulty record keeping and substandard aircraft maintenance. Congressional investigators, who conducted their own probe into the airline, allege the company falsified flight time records and forced crews to fly more hours than federal rules permit.
The carrier, and its affiliate, Gulfstream Training Academy, provided training and initial airline experience to Marvin Renslow, the captain of Continental Connection Flight 3407. Fifty people died in the Feb. 12 crash of the plane. The FAA has notified Gulfstream that it could face the penalty, giving Gulfstream 30 days to respond to the allegations, according to a filing Gulfstream made with the Securities and Exchange Commission earlier this month. After that period, the FAA will decide whether to assess the penalty.
Robert Brown, chief financial officer of Gulfstream International Group Inc., the parent company of both the airline and the training academy, said Thursday the company intends to submit evidence refuting the alleged FAA infractions. He said the company would offer additional information to demonstrate that no violations occurred. Mr. Brown declined further comment and referred questions to the company's chief executive, David Hackett, who didn't return calls.
Capt. Renslow had flunked a number of proficiency checks as a private pilot and while training at Gulfstream, and he failed at least one other flight test while he was at Colgan Air Inc., the airline that operated Flight 3407, according to the National Transportation Safety Board.
Investigators say all of the plane's systems appeared to have been functioning well and that the crash was the result of pilot error. They are examining whether Capt. Renslow was adequately trained on emergency equipment installed to protect against an aerodynamic stall on the Bombardier Q400 turboprop plane, according to testimony.
Pilots in the two previous fatal U.S. commuter crashes -- both caused by pilot error -- also spent time at either Gulfstream International Airlines or Gulfstream's training operations, according to reports by the NTSB.
The FAA said Gulfstream Academy relinquished its certificate as an FAA-approved flight training school on May 12, the day the NTSB opened a public hearing on the Buffalo crash. Not having the certificate limits the type of training the academy can offer.
The proposed possible FAA penalty and other troubles confronting Gulfstream, of Fort Lauderdale, Fla., reflect broader concerns about the safety of commuter airlines, which account for 51% of all commercial U.S. flights. Gulfstream International's shares Thursday were up 2.1% to close at $2.90 on the American Stock Exchange. The shares are up 93% for the year to date.
Major carriers increasingly rely on commuter airlines to ferry passengers to airline hubs from smaller cities. Regulators and federal safety experts are examining whether pilots at some of these commuter carriers receive sufficient training. They are scrutinizing whether independent training institutes such as Gulfstream Academy produce pilots with sufficient skill and experience to fly the growing number of turboprops and jets at these smaller airlines.
Some of the questions about Gulfstream go to the heart of another safety concern: pilot fatigue. Gulfstream, which primarily serves Florida and the Bahamas, and some routes through Cleveland, flies routes for Continental Airlines Inc., UAL Corp.'s United Airlines, and Delta Air Lines Inc.'s Northwest Airlines unit.
According to congressional investigators, the FAA's probe of Gulfstream Airlines was touched off last summer by pilots who claimed they had been fired or threatened after they raised safety concerns about flight schedules that exceeded the maximum number of hours allowed by federal regulations.
Some pilots claimed they had been punished for refusing to fly substandard aircraft, including planes allegedly dispatched in stormy weather with inoperative systems such as weather radar, according to congressional investigators. The House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, according to one of these investigators, began looking into the allegations after some of the pilots said their previous efforts to raise the issue with the FAA's office responsible for investigating so-called whistleblower complaints had stalled.
House investigators interviewed witnesses, who claim that Gulfstream engaged in systematic falsification of records to cover up flight schedules that exceeded maximum hours allowed under federal rules.
One retired Gulfstream official, according to a House investigator, alleged that when pilots were asked to fly trips which they believed would put them in violation of federal rules, airline schedulers routinely used a second set of flight-schedule books to hide the excess flight hours. The House committee raised the issue with the FAA last summer in response to pilots' concerns that their allegations had not been properly vetted by the FAA, according to congressional investigators.
In response to questions from The Wall Street Journal on Thursday, the FAA said the alleged crew overscheduling stemmed from a failure to accurately transfer data from manually generated aircraft logbook records to an electronic record-keeping system. "The discrepancies resulted in scheduling crew members in excess of daily and weekly flight-time limitations," according to an FAA release. An agency spokeswoman said, "We didn't find any evidence of deliberate action" to falsify records.
A June 2008 inspection, according to the FAA, revealed that "unapproved automotive air-conditioner compressors" were installed on certain aircraft between September 2006 and May 2008. The airline grounded the affected aircraft and replaced the suspect compressors with approved aviation parts.
In October 2004, a Pinnacle Airlines regional jet without passengers crashed outside of Jefferson City, Mo., after the two pilots flew too high, induced an aerodynamic stall and both engines flamed out. Both aviators were killed. The captain on that flight was a captain at Gulfstream Airlines from 2000 to 2002, and the first officer attended Gulfstream Academy in 2002, then flew as a first officer for Gulfstream Airlines, according to the NTSB.
In August 2006, 49 people died when a Comair regional jet took off from Lexington, Ky., on the wrong runway which was half the length of the one it was supposed to use. The first officer was the sole survivor. He joined Gulfstream Airlines in 1997 as a captain, then was a simulator instructor before joining Comair, a unit of Delta Air Lines, as a co-pilot.
Write to Andy Pasztor at [email protected] and Susan Carey at [email protected]
Printed in The Wall Street Journal, page A3
 
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Exec Says Pilot Should Not Have Flown

Exec Says Pilot Should Not Have Flown
Captain in Crash That Killed 50 Had Failed Five Pilot Tests

CNN

Aug. 7) -- An airline executive whose plane crashed earlier this year said although the pilot was "a fine man by all accounts," had the airline "known what we know now ... he would not have been in that seat."Colgan Air Flight 3407 crashed near Buffalo, N.Y., on Feb. 12, killing all 49 on the plane and one person on the ground.

After the deadly accident, it was revealed by Colgan Air that the pilot, Capt. Marvin Renslow, had failed five pilot tests, known as 'check-rides,' three of which occurred before he joined the airline. Renslow had revealed only one of those failures to the airline, according to Colgan.
Philip Trenary, president and CEO of Pinnacle Airlines, which is the parent company of Colgan Air, told the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee on Thursday that while "a failure on a check-ride is not necessarily a reason for someone not to fly, it depends on what kind of failure it is."
"The failures that we were unable to see were the basic fundamental failures that you would not want to have," Trenary told the hearing, which was examining relationships between regional airline networks and safety issues.
"Let me stress one thing, Capt. Renslow was a fine man by all accounts," Trenary said. But he added, "Had we known what we know now, no, he would not have been in that seat."
In response to speculation that Renslow was impaired by fatigue, Trenary told the committee the fatigue policy of both Pinnacle and Colgan airlines is clear. "If a pilot is fatigued for any reason, all they have to do is say so and they are excused from duty. The night of (Flight) 3407, we did have 11 reserve pilots available."

Colgan has insisted that pilot fatigue was not a factor in the crash, noting that Renslow had "nearly 22 consecutive hours of time off before he reported for duty on the day of the accident."
There were also reports that Renslow's co-pilot, Rebecca Shaw, was feeling ill and had considered backing out of the flight, according to a cockpit voice recorder transcript released by the National Transportation Safety Board.
The flight, which was part of the Continental Connection schedule, plunged into a house in Clarence Center, N.Y.
According to investigators, the crash resulted from Renslow's incorrect response to a precarious drop in air speed. Renslow reportedly overrode an emergency system known as a stick pusher, which sends the plane into a dive so it can avoid a stall and regain speed.


 
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Buffalo crash pilots discussed sickness, low pay

Buffalo crash pilots discussed sickness, low pay

WASHINGTON -The co-pilot in February's airline crash in upstate New York complained to the flight's captain that she felt ill and would have skipped the flight but didn't want to pay for a hotel room, according to a new cockpit voice recorder transcript released Monday.
The extended transcript, released by the National Transportation Safety Board, shows pilot Marvin Renslow commiserated with First Officer Rebecca Shaw, but didn't suggest she pull out of the flight.
Federal Aviation Administration regulations say pilots should not fly if they're feeling sick. The captain is responsible for overseeing their crew.
The two conversed while Continental Connection Flight 3407 sat on the ground waiting for clearance to takeoff from Newark Liberty International Airport.
Shaw told Renslow that if she had felt as sick the day before when she was at home near Seattle, she wouldn't have commuted to Newark to make the flight.
"I'm ready to be in the hotel room," Shaw told Renslow after one of several sniffle sounds noted on the transcript. "This is one of those times that if I felt like this when I was at home there's no way I would have come all the way out here. But now that I'm out here."
"You might as well," Renslow responded.
"I mean if I call in sick now, I've got to put myself in a hotel room until I feel better," said Shaw, who also complained about her low salary. "We'll see how ... it feels flying. If the pressure's just too much I, you know, I could always call in tomorrow. At least I'm in a hotel on the company's buck, but we'll see. I'm pretty tough."
Renslow suggested to Shaw that she "kill it with, you know, a bunch of OJ or a bunch of vitamin C."
Shaw also complained about poor treatment by Colgan Air Inc. of Manassas, Va., which operated the flight for Continental Airlines. She said she earned only $15,800 the previous year and the airline was refusing to give her $200 in back pay she felt she was owed.
Flight 3407 crashed on Feb. 12 as the twin-engine turboprop began preparations for landing in Buffalo, killing all 49 people aboard and a man in a house below. Testimony at an NTSB hearing in May showed Renslow and Shaw made a series of critical errors leading up to the crash.
Shaw commuted the night before the crash from Seattle to Newark, N.J., to make the flight to Buffalo. Renslow, who was in the middle of a series of flights, lived near Tampa, Fla., but commuted to Newark, where he was based.
It's not clear where either pilot slept the night before the crash or how long they slept, but it appeared from testimony that they may have tried to nap in a crew lounge at the airport rather than pay for a hotel room. A fatigue expert testified that the pilots' judgment was likely impaired by fatigue.
Colgan spokesman Joe Williams said in a statement that the airline doesn't condone pilots flying when they are sick or fatigued.
"Every Colgan Air pilot has an absolute obligation as a professional to show up for work fit for duty," Williams said. "As is common in the airline industry, we have reserve pilots available in case they are not."
Revelations about the pilots' behavior, low pay and commuting practices sparked a backlash against low pilot pay and working conditions in the regional airline industry. Two congressional committee have held hearings on safety issues that have arisen from NTSB's investigation of the crash. FAA is holding a series of industry workshops around the country aimed at beefing up regional airline safety. The accident also has prompted the agency to revisit the long festering issue of whether regulations on how many hours pilots can be required to work before they are given rest should be updated to reflect modern fatigue research.
On Tuesday, Rep. Jerry Costello, D-Ill., chairman of the aviation subcommittee, is expected to offer a proposal to address some of the fatigue, pay, and other issues that pilots complain are undermining safety.
 

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Reporte Final NTSB 02/02/2010

Para terminar con las especulaciones y con "los yo creo que"... aquí el reporte final de la investigación.
Ojalá que en nuestros Países hubiera esta obligación (por parte de las autoridades) de publicar en aras de la verdad, la seguridad y memoria de los caidos, los reportes de los accidentes de manera creible y sin sesgos.
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Colgan DH8D at Buffalo on Feb 12th 2009, impacted home while on approach


By Simon Hradecky, created Wednesday, Feb 3rd 2010 01:28Z, last updated Wednesday, Feb 3rd 2010 01:30Z


In the Board Meeting on Feb 2nd the NTSB adopted the following 46 findings, probable cause and 25 recommendations:

Findings:

1. The flight crew was properly certificated and qualified in accordance with applicable Federal regulations.
2. The airplane was properly certified, equipped, and maintained in accordance with Federal regulations.
3. The recovered components showed no evidence of any preimpact structural, engine, or system failures, including no indications of any problems with the airplane’s ice protection system.
4. The air traffic controllers who were responsible for the flight during its approach to Buffalo-Niagara International Airport performed their duties properly and responded immediately and appropriately to the loss of radio and radar contact with the flight.
5. This accident was not survivable.
6. The captain’s inappropriate aft control column inputs in response to the stick shaker caused the airplane’s wing to stall.
7. The minimal aircraft performance degradation resulting from ice accumulation did not affect the flight crew’s ability to fly and control the airplane.
8. Explicit cues associated with the impending stick shaker onset, including the decreasing margin between indicated airspeed and the low-speed cue, the airspeed trend vector pointing downward into the low-speed cue, the changing color of the numbers on the airplane’s indicated airspeed display, and the airplane’s excessive nose-up pitch attitude, were presented on the flight instruments with adequate time for the pilots to initiate corrective action, but neither pilot responded to the presence of these cues.
9. The reason the captain did not recognize the impending onset of the stick shaker could not be determined from the available evidence, but the first officer’s tasks at the time the low-speed cue was visible would have likely reduced opportunities for her timely recognition of the impending event; the failure of both pilots to detect this situation was the result of a significant breakdown in their monitoring responsibilities and workload management.
10. The flight crew did not consider the position of the reference speeds switch when the stick shaker activated.
11. The captain’s response to stick shaker activation should have been automatic, but his improper flight control inputs were inconsistent with his training and were instead consistent with startle and confusion.
12. The captain did not recognize the stick pusher’s action to decrease angle-of-attack as a proper step in a stall recovery, and his improper flight control inputs to override the stick pusher exacerbated the situation.
13. It is unlikely that the captain was deliberately attempting to perform a tailplane stall recovery.
14. No evidence indicated that the Q400 was susceptible to a tailplane stall.
15. Although the reasons the first officer retracted the flaps and suggested raising the gear could not be determined from the available information, these actions were inconsistent with company stall recovery procedures and training.
16. The Q400 airspeed indicator lacked low-speed awareness features, such as an amber band above the low-speed cue or airspeed indications that changed to amber as speed decrease toward the low-speed cue, that would have facilitated the flight crew’s detection of the developing low-speed situation.
17. An aural warning in advance of the stick shaker would have provided a redundant cue of the visual indication of the rising low-speed cue and might have elicited a timely response from the pilots before the onset of the stick shaker.
18. The captain’s failure to effectively manage the flight (1) enabled conversation that delayed checklist completion and conflicted with sterile cockpit procedures and (2) created an environment that impeded timely error detection.
19. The monitoring errors made by the accident flight crew demonstrate the continuing need for specific pilot training on active monitoring skills.
20. Colgan Air’s standard operating procedures at the time of the accident did not promote effective monitoring behavior.
21. Specific leadership training for upgrading captains would help standardize and reinforce the critical command authority skills needed by a pilot-in-command during air carrier operations.
22. Because of the continuing number of accidents involving a breakdown of sterile cockpit discipline, collaborative action by the Federal Aviation Administration and the aviation industry to promptly address this issue is warranted.
23. The flight crewmembers’ performance during the flight, including the captain’s deviations from standard operating procedures and the first officer’s failure to challenge these deviations, was not consistent with the crew resource management (CRM) training that they had received or the concepts in the Federal Aviation Administration’s CRM guidance.
24. The pilots’ performance was likely impaired because of fatigue, but the extent of their impairment and the degree to which it contributed to the performance deficiencies that occurred during the flight cannot be conclusively determined.
25. All pilots, including those who commute to their home base of operations, have a personal responsibility to wisely manage their off-duty time and effectively use available rest periods so that they can arrive for work fit for duty; the accident pilots did not do so by using an inappropriate facility during their last rest period before the accident flight.
26. Colgan Air did not proactively address the pilot fatigue hazards associated with operations at a predominantly commuter base.
27. Operators have a responsibility to identify risks associated with commuting, implement strategies to mitigate these risks, and ensure that their commuting pilots are fit for duty.
28. The first officer’s illness symptoms did not likely affect her performance directly during the flight.
29. The captain had not established a good foundation of attitude instrument flying skills early in his career, and his continued weaknesses in basic aircraft control and instrument flying were not identified and adequately addressed.
30. Remedial training and additional oversight for pilots with training deficiencies and failures would help ensure that the pilots have mastered the necessary skills for safe flight.
31. Colgan Air’s electronic pilot training records did not contain sufficient detail for the company or its principal operations inspector to properly analyze the captain’s trend of unsatisfactory performance.
32. Notices of disapproval need to be considered along with other available information about pilot applicants so that air carriers can fully identify those pilots who have a history of unsatisfactory performance.
33. Colgan Air did not use all available sources of information on the flight crew’s qualifications and previous performance to determine the crew’s suitability for work at the company.
34. Colgan Air’s procedures and training at the time of the accident did not specifically require flight crews to cross-check the approach speed bug settings in relation to the reference speeds switch position; such awareness is important because a mismatch between the bugs and the switch could lead to an early stall warning.
35. The current air carrier approach-to-stall training did not fully prepare the flight crew for an unexpected stall in the Q400 and did not address the actions that are needed to recover from a fully developed stall.
36. The circumstances of this and other accidents in which pilots have responded incorrectly to the stick pusher demonstrate the continuing need to train pilots on the actions of the stick pusher and the airplane’s initial response to the pusher.
37. Pilots could have a better understanding of an airplane’s flight characteristics during the post-stall flight regime if realistic, fully developed stall models were incorporated into simulators that are approved for such training.
38. The inclusion of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration icing video in Colgan Air’s winter operations training may lead pilots to assume that a tailplane stall might be possible in the Q400, resulting in negative training.
39. The current Federal Aviation Administration surveillance standards for oversight at air carriers undergoing rapid growth and increased complexity of operations do not guarantee that any challenges encountered by the carriers as a result of these changes will be appropriately mitigated.
40. Mandatory flight operational quality assurance programs would enhance flight safety because all operators would have readily available data to identify operational risks and use in developing corrective actions.
41. The viability of flight operational quality assurance programs depends on the confidentiality of the data, which would currently not be guaranteed if operators were required to implement these programs and required to share the data with the Federal Aviation Administration.
 

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42. The systematic monitoring of all available safety data, as part of a flight operational quality assurance program, could provide operators with objective information regarding the manner in which flights are conducted, and a periodic review of this information would enhance flight safety by assisting operators in detecting and correcting deviations from standard operating procedures.
43. Distractions caused by personal portable electronic devices affect flight safety because they can detract from a flight crew’s ability to monitor and cross-check instruments, detect hazards, and avoid errors.
44. The current use of safety alerts for operators to transmit safety-critical information is not effective because oversight and documentation of an operator’s response are not required and critical safety issues may not be effectively addressed.
45. Weather documents missing key weather products or containing products that are no longer valid prevent flight crewmembers from having relevant, readily available weather-related safety information for preflight and in-flight decision-making.
46. Detailed icing definitions that include accretion rates and recommended pilot actions would help pilots more accurately determine the icing conditions to report in airframe icing pilot reports and more effectively respond to those conditions.
 

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Probable Cause:

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the captain’s inappropriate response to the activation of the stick shaker, which led to an aerodynamic stall from which the airplane did not recover. Contributing to the accident were (1) the flight crew’s failure to monitor airspeed in relation to the rising position of the low-speed cue, (2) the flight crew’s failure to adhere to sterile cockpit procedures, (3) the captain’s failure to effectively manage the flight, and (4) Colgan Air’s inadequate procedures for airspeed selection and management during approaches in icing conditions.

Recommendations:

As a result of the investigation of this accident, the National Transportation Safety Board makes the following recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration:

1. Require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91K operators to review their standard operating procedures to verify that they are consistent with the flight crew monitoring techniques described in Advisory Circular (AC) 120-71A, “Standard Operating Procedures for Flight Deck Crewmembers”; if the procedures are found not to be consistent, revise the procedures according to the AC guidance to promote effective monitoring. (A-10-XX)
2. For all airplanes engaged in commercial operations under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Parts 121, 135, and 91K, require the installation of low-airspeed alert systems that provide pilots with redundant aural and visual warnings of an impending hazardous low-speed condition. (Supersedes Safety Recommendations A-03-53 and -54)
3. Require that airspeed indicator display systems on all aircraft certified under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 25 and equipped with electronic flight instrument systems depict a yellow/amber cautionary band above the low-speed cue or the digits on the airspeed indicator change from white to amber/yellow as the speed approaches the low-speed cue, consistent with Federal Aviation Administration Advisory Circular 25-11A.
4. Issue an advisory circular with guidance on leadership training for upgrading captains at 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91K operators, including methods and techniques for effective leadership; professional standards of conduct; strategies for briefing and debriefing; reinforcement and correction skills; and other knowledge, skills, and abilities that are critical for air carrier operations. (A-10-XX)
5. Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91K operators to provide a specific course on leadership training to their upgrading captains that is consistent with the advisory circular requested in Safety Recommendation [2]. (A-10-XX)
6. Develop, and distribute to all pilots, multimedia guidance materials on professionalism in aircraft operations that contain standards of performance for professionalism; best practices for sterile cockpit adherence; techniques for assessing and correcting pilot deviations; examples and scenarios; and a detailed review of accidents involving breakdowns in sterile cockpit and other procedures, including this accident. Obtain the input of operators and air carrier and general aviation pilot groups in the development and distribution of these guidance materials. (A-10-XX) (Supersedes Safety Recommendation A-07-8 )
7. Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91K operators to address fatigue risks associated with commuting, including identifying pilots who commute, establishing policy and guidance to mitigate fatigue risks for commuting pilots, using scheduling practices to minimize opportunities for fatigue in commuting pilots, and developing or identifying rest facilities for commuting pilots. (A-10-XX)
8. Require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91K operators to document and retain electronic and/or paper records of pilot training and checking events in sufficient detail so that the carrier and its principal operations inspector can fully assess a pilot’s entire training performance. (A-10-XX)
9. Require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91K operators to include the training records requested in Safety Recommendation [6] as part of the remedial training program requested in Safety Recommendation A-05-14.
10. Require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91K operators to provide the training records requested in Safety Recommendation [6] to hiring employers to fulfill their requirement under Pilot Records Improvement Act.
11. Develop a process for verifying, validating, auditing, and amending pilot training records at 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91K operators to guarantee the accuracy and completeness of the records. (A-10-XX)
12. Direct all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91K operators of airplanes equipped with a reference speeds switch or similar device to (1) develop procedures to establish that, during approach and landing, airspeed reference bugs are always matched to the position of the switch and (2) implement specific training to ensure that pilots demonstrate proficiency in this area. (A-10-XX)
13. Require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91K operators and 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 142 training centers to develop and conduct training that incorporates stalls that are fully developed; are unexpected; involve autopilot disengagement; and include airplane-specific features, such as a reference speeds switch. (A-10-XX)
14. Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91K operators of stick pusher-equipped aircraft to provide their pilots with pusher familiarization simulator training. (A-10-XX) (Supersedes Safety Recommendation A-07-4)
15. Define and codify minimum simulator model fidelity requirements to support an expanded set of stall recovery training requirements, including recovery from stalls that are fully developed. These simulator fidelity requirements should address areas such as required angle-of-attack and sideslip angle ranges, motion cueing, proof-of-match with post-stall flight test data, and warnings to indicate when the simulator flight envelope has been exceeded. (A-10-XX)
16. Identify which airplanes operated under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91K are susceptible to tailplane stalls and then (1) require operators of those airplanes to provide an appropriate airplane-specific tailplane stall recovery procedure in their training manuals and company procedures and (2) direct operators of those airplanes that are not susceptible to tailplane stalls to ensure that training and company guidance for the airplanes explicitly state this lack of susceptibility and contain no references to tailplane stall recovery procedures. (A-10-XX)
17. Develop more stringent standards for surveillance of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121, 135, and 91K operators that are experiencing rapid growth, increased complexity of operations, accidents and/or incidents, or other changes that warrant increased oversight, including the following: (1) verify that inspector staffing is adequate to accomplish the enhanced surveillance that is promulgated by the new standards, (2) increase staffing for those certificates with insufficient staffing levels, and (3) augment the inspector staff with available and airplane-type-qualified inspectors from all Federal Aviation Administration regions and 14 CFR Part 142 training centers to provide quality assurance over the operators’ aircrew program designee workforce. (A-10-XX)
18. Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91K operators to (1) develop and implement flight operational quality assurance programs that collect objective flight data; (2) analyze these data and implement corrective actions to identified systems safety issues; and (3) share the deidentified aggregate data generated through these analyses with other interested parties in the aviation industry through appropriate means. (A-10-XX)
19. Seek specific statutory and/or regulatory authority to protect data that operators share with the Federal Aviation Administration as part of any flight operational quality assurance program. (A-10-XX)
20. Require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91K operators to (1) routinely download and analyze all available sources of safety information, as part of their flight operational quality assurance program, to identify deviations from established norms and procedures; (2) provide appropriate protections to ensure the confidentiality of the deidentified aggregate data; and (3) ensure that this information is used for safety-related and not punitive purposes. (A-10-XX)
21. Require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91K operators to incorporate explicit guidance to pilots, including checklist reminders as appropriate, prohibiting the use of personal portable electronic devices on the flight deck. (A-10-XX)
22. Implement a process to document that all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91K operators have taken appropriate action in response to safety-critical information transmitted through the safety alert for operators process or another method. (A-10-XX)
23. Require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91K operators to revise the methodology for programming their adverse weather phenomena reporting and forecasting subsystems so that the subsystem-generated weather document for each flight contains all pertinent weather information, including Airmen’s Meteorological Information, Significant Meteorological Information, and other National Weather Service in-flight weather advisories, and omits weather information that is no longer valid. (A-10-XX)
 

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24. Require principal operations inspectors of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91K operators to periodically review the weather documents generated for their carriers to verify that those documents are consistent with the information requested in Safety Recommendation [21] (A-10-XX)
25. Update the definitions for reportable icing intensities in the Aeronautical Information Manual so that the definitions are consistent with the more detailed intensities defined in Advisory Circular 91-74A, “Pilot Guide: Flight in Icing Conditions.” (A-10-XX)
 
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